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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action arose on an Order to Show Cause in Re 
Modification wherein Appellant Mable Laak sought to increase 
the alimony provisions of the original Decree of Divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN 
THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court denied Appellant's Motion and Order 
to Show Cause in Re Modification and continued the alimony at 
$200.00 per month. 
•RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant seeks to have the alimony provisions con-
tained in the Decree of Divorce modified upward to the sum of 
Three Hundred Fifty Dollars per month. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were first married in early 1950. Two 
minor children were born as issue of the marriage of the parties, 
to wit: Walter L. Laak, Jr., born December 2, 1950, and Gary 
Roger Laak, born Septeiober 10, 1354, (R.l) The parties were sub-
sequently divorced and remarried in September, 1960, (R.l). On 
November 6, 1963, the plaintiff, Walter L. Laak, filed an action 
in divorce against the defendant, Mable Laak (R.3). 
Mrs. Laak, in response to Mr. Laak's Complaint in di-
vorce, entertained a Separate Maintenance suit against Mr. Laak, 
(R.12). 
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On November 29, 1963, the parties entered into a 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, (R.7-10). The 
Stipulation provided as follows: v i^  -
1. Defendant was awarded the following items: , 
(a) $200.00 per month as permanent alimony, ef-
fective upon the legal emancipation of Gary Roger Laak. 
(b) Equity derived from the sale of the home of 
the parties after payment of £1,171.32 on bills, and $500 to 
Mrs, Laak's attorney. 
(c) Property located in Cedar City, Utah, as her 
sole and separate property. 
(d) Motor vehicle, subject to its indebtedness. 
(e) All the household furnishings and furniture. 
2. The plaintiff Mr. Laak received a motor vehicle, 
subject to its indebtedness and a 10-share certificate of rail-
road stock and was obligated to pay: 
(a) $350.00 per month as child support. 
(b) The Outstanding loans against two insurance 
policies, to be paid in a period of 10 years. 
(c) Health insurance for the benefit of the minor 
children. 
(d) Back taxes for the property located in Cedar 
City, for the year 1968, 
This Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement were 
specifically incorporated into the Decree of Divorce which was 
entered on December 3, 1963, (R.19-23). 
On October 9, 1969, the parties herein again entered in-
to a Stipulation, which provided for a change of custody of Walter 
L. Laak, Jr., from liable Laak to Walter L. Laak. The Stipulation 
also provided for a reduction in Mr. Laak's child support payments 
reducing the amount to $75.00 per month, for the benefit of Gary 
Laak. Who was under the control of the juvenile authorities. 
In addition, Mr. Laak was to pay to Mable Laak, the sum 
of $200.00 per month as alimony, (R.43-44). On October 
10, 1969, the Court entered its Order incorporating the 
referenced written Stipulation into its Order, (R.45-46). 
Finally, on November 29, 1974, the Court again entered 
its Order based upon Stipulation of the parties and their res-
pective counsel, wherein the Order stated: 
"It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that Plaintiff be ordered to continue the pay-
ment of alimony at the rate of $200.00 per 
month under the terms and conditions as pre-
scribed in the original Decree and that this 
Order is based upon the existing circumstances 
at the time of the original Decree." 
"It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that each and every other term and condition 
of the original Decree of Divorce is in full 
force and effect*" i{R*90-91). 
Thereafter, Mable Laak filed and sought a modification 
of the Decree of Divorce to raise the alimony based upon a change 
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of circumstances, (R.92-93, 100-101). Appellant sought the in-
' crease based upon three factors which she alleged constitute a 
substantial change of circumstances: 
(a) Walter L. Laak's earnings had substantially 
increased. 
(b) The minor children of the parties are no longer 
:
 minors and respondent doesn't pay any child support. 
.(c)-... Appellant's needs have increased, (R.92-93). 
(Appellant's Brief, Page 2). 
The plaintiff presently pays alimony to the defendant 
in the amount of $200.00 per month and is current on all said 
payments, (R.106-107). That during the calendar year, 1974, 
the defendant's net earnings were $1,102.00 per month, (R.147, 
L10-11). That the defendant was 51 years old, (R.128, L25-26), 
and presently unemployed but drawing unemployment compensation 
since July, 1974, in the amount of $23.00 per week, (R.106-107). 
That defendant's living expenses were approximately $388.00 per 
month, (R.92). That ttie defendant was healthy, capable and had 
no physical infirmities of alny kind whatsoever, and had been i 
continuously employed since the divorce, (R.124, L14-21). That < 
she can handle jobs without difficulty, (R.123, L23-30). She 
stated she will find work, (R.127, L29 - R.128, L3). It is her 
desire to work, (R.127, L26-30). 
I 
1 
Mr. Laak is presently providing over half of Mrs. Laak's 
monthly living expanses. This leaves Mrs. Laak to her own re-
sources to come up with less than half or approximately 48 per-
cent of her needs. This will require her to earn no more than 
$188.00 per month. 
She has demonstrated through a continuous course of 
employment, that she has the ability to do this and as late as 
August 5, 1974# when she terminated at the J.C. Penny Company, 
she was making, according to her 1974 tax return, for the first 
7 months of 1974, at least $265.71 per month. 
Mr. Laak is still paying on some of the Divorce Decree 
obligations, and while looking forward to his date of retirement 
when he will experience a decrease in his earning capacity, he 
will remain faced with the continuing obligation of payment of 
$200.00 per month alimony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: WHEN A STIPULATION, WHICH IS INCOPORATED 
INTO THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, PROHIBITS 
MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY UPWARD, DOES 
THE COURT HAVE THE POWER TO MODIFY THE 
ORIGINAL DECREE;.'.:. 
The Utah Courts have the general power to modify a 
Decree of Divorce for alimony or support, and that power is not 
affected by the fact that the Decree is based on an agreement 
entered into by the parties to the action. (Section 30-3-5, Utah 
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Code Annoted, 1953, As Amended; Buzzo v. Buzzo [1915] 45 Utah 
625, 148P. 362; Barraclough v. Barraclough [1941] 100 Utah 196, 
111 P.2d 792; Jones v. Jones [1943] 104 Utah 275f 139 P.2d 222; 
Callister v, Callister [1953] 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 and Felt 
v. Felt, [1972] 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620). 
POINT II: WHEN THE STIPULATION AND THE ORIGINAL DECREE 
CONTEMPLATE THE VERY THING COMPLAINED OF IN 
THE PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY 
THE MODIFICATION SHOULD BE DENIED. 
Petitions of this kind should be entertained with great 
caution and the Court snould be very slow under the circumstances 
to revise or alter the former Decree. (Viles v. Viles [C.A.3 
Virgin Islands, 1953] 316 F2d 31 and Kate v. Kate [1951] 234 
Minn. 402, 48 N.?2d 551.) 
Both parties were advised by competent counsel, and it 
is clear by the working of the Stipulation that the parties un-
questionably had a specific intention in the settlement of ali-
mony on a permanent basis, planning for the future events which 
have taken place. 
"Defendant agrees that she does not need alimony at 
the present time and requests the court to enter its 
order to the effect that upon the legal emancipation 
of Gary Roger Laak she be awarded the sum of $200 
per month as permanent alimony and that plaintiff 
agrees that the court may enter its order providing 
that upon the legal emancipation of Gary Roger Laak 
he be ordered to pay for the benefit of defendant, 
the sum of $200 per month constituting permanent -
alimony, not subject to modification upward by 
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defendant. Walter L. Laak and Mable Laak further 
state that they understand that in the event Mable 
Laak remarries between the time of the divorce decree 
and the time alimony is set to commence or after 
alimony commences, her right to alimony shall be 
forever terminated." (R.7-8, emphasis added,) 
Gary Roger Laak was born September 10, 1954, R,l)# and 
his emancipation would not have occurred until age 21 in 1975 
or by marriage, (Section 15-2-1 U.C.A. 1953) and must have been 
CQiatemplated by the parties with advice of counsel. He is emanci-
pated and is no longer in need of child support, (having joined the 
military service,) (R.1-31/-L19-20). The emancipation of Gary 
Roger Laak took place on or Before July 20, 1974, (R.66). 
Mrs, Laak was unemployed at the time of the divorce, 
(R.122), Yet, she stated that she did not need alimony at the 
time the divorce was granted. 
By inference, it would appear that Mrs, Laak had care-
fully considered the situation and decided that she could appro-
priately live until the emancipation of the youngest minor child 
of the parties in 1975, on the basis of child support in the 
amount of $350 per month, the assets awarded to her in the Decree 
of Divorce, and her own individual earnings, although not mentioned* 
On October 9, 1969, the parties again entered into 
a Stipulation and Order, thereon dated October 10, 1969, which 
provided Mable L. Laak with alimony in the amount of $200 per 
month. 
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The Stipulation and Order also transferred custody of 
Walter L. Laak, Jr., to his father. The Stipulation and Order 
also provided that the father, Mr. Laak, pay support in the 
amount of $75 per month to the Department of Family Services 
for Gary Roger Laak who left the home of his mother and placed 
himself in the hands of the juvenile authorities, (R.43-46 and 
R.149, L7-12). 
It appears to have been the intention of the parties 
and the Court at that time to make adjustments because of new 
circumstances existing at that time. Custody of one of the 
children was transferred from Mrs. Laak to the father and the 
other child was placed in the care of the juvenile authorities 
and payments in child support by Mr. Laak no longer were going 
to Mrs. Laak but were being paid at a reduced amount to the Depart-
ment of Family Services. This was approximately one year after 
the Decree of Divorce, during which time Mrs. Laak remained 
unemployed, apparently having decided not to work until this 
time. (R.122, L27-29). 
The next Order that was entered by the Court was 
dated November 29, 1974. That Order specifically states as 
follows: 
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff be ordered to continue the payment of 
alimony at the rate of $200.00 per month under:, the 
terms and conditions as prescribed in the original 
Decree and that this Order is based upon the existing 
circumstances at the time of the original Decree* 
"It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
each and every other term and condition of the ori-
ginal Decree of Divorce is in full force and effect." 
(R.90-91, emphasis added). 
This Order was likewise stipulated to by the parties 
with the advice of their counsel, (R.90). 
Careful reading of the Order implies that it was the 
intent of the parties and the Court that the payment of the 
alimony at the rate of $200 per month, as of November 29, 1974, 
would be based upon the existing circumstances at the time of 
the original Decree and that each and every term and condition 
of the original Decree of Divorce would be in full force and 
effect. 
Mrs. Laak, at this time, was unemployed and had been 
unemployed since July of 1974. Gary Roger Laak, at this time, 
was emancipated, having been emancipated on or before July 20, 
1974, (R.66). Mrs. Laak also had whatever was remaining of the 
assets and equities originally awarded to her at the time of 
the entry of the Decree. 
Viles v. Viles (C.A. 3 Virgin Islands, 1963) 316F 2d 
31 is specifically on point. The Court, in that case, consi-
dered §13 of the divorce law of the Virgin Islands, 1944, 16 
V.I.C, §110, which expressly granted the District Court powers 
to "set aside, alter or modify so much of the judgment as may 
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provide alimony ...or the maintenance of either party in the 
action." (Ibid, at page 33). In that case, the original 
Decree made the determination that so long as the husband's 
total annual income should be $17,500 or more, he would pay his 
wife support in the amount of $5,500 per year in equal monthly 
installments. The Decree also had a ". *.provision for reduction 
of annual payments 'proportionately1 to not less than $3,600 
whenever the husband's income should fall below $17,500." (Ibid. 
at page 32.) "...so long as the husband's income did not fall 
below $11,455." (Ibid at 35.) The trial court gave the defen-
dant relief, reducing his payments to $2,500 annually although 
his income had not fallen below the $11,455 figure. 
The Circuit Court went on to say that: "The fact that 
an award of alimony has been based on a separage agreement may pro-
vide a sound reason for judicial reluctance to modify the ori-
ginal Decree. 
"...the original decree should be treated as a final 
adjudication of the rights of the parties at the time 
it is entered, and the court which entered it should be 
presumed, in the absence of a direct appeal, to have 
given appropriate consideration to the circumstances 
which should have affected its judgment. ...Moreover, 
it is quite proper for the court, in framing the original 
decree, to anticipate future changes in circumstances 
of the parties and to provide specific adjustments of 
:
 the postmarital rights and duties of the parties which 
will be made in the event that the circumstances do 
change as anticipated. ...When it is clear that the 
court which entered the original decree has considered 
and provided for future eventualities, the party 
seeking a modification of h is obligation should be 
required to prove more than what the events antici-
pated have actually occurred." 
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The Utah Supreme Court has followed that line of 
reasoning in its decision on Short v» Short, [1971] 25 Utah 2d 
326, 481 P2d 54. When a husband petitioned for modification 
of alimony because his former wife had obtained employment, the 
Court determined that the modification should be denied where 
the original award was obviously based on the assumption that 
the wife, who had previously held a job, would again be able 
to obtain employment. 
The Court stated: 
"We think the facts in this case themselves reflect no 
• abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court 
in refusing to vacate the $75 alimony award," ...the 
denial was not capricious when viewed in the light 
of circumstances existing at the time of the decree, 
the $75 award implemented by a necessary and ines-
capable assumption by the court that Mrs. S. could 
not survive under any conceivable hypothesis on $75 
per month, and there is nothing in the record to 
indicate she had any other means of livlihood." 
{Ibid, at page 327). 
Also, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in analyzing this 
same problem stated: 
"...the alimony awarded in (the original decree) was 
fixed by a bargain and not by an original judicial de-
termination of the amount to which defendant was then 
entitled. If defendant wishes to default on her bar-
gain, she may not at the same time seek to use it as 
a measure of her present rights. If the alimony which 
she is presently receiving is adequate, considering 
all of the factors governing an original award, then 
there is no occasion to modify the award merely be-
cause the alimony that she bargained for and received 
in (the original Decree) gave her a better standard of 
living then than it does today. The circumstances of 
the parties may have changed materially, and yet, 
if defendant drove a hard bargain in her original 
agreement for a property settlement and alimony, she 
may still be receiving all that a court would be re-
quired to award her if it were considering the matter 
originally. In such a case, there is no abuse of dis-
cretion if the trial Court determines that no revision 
of the decree is•necessary." (Kate v. Kate, Supra.) 
It would appear that defendant's present circumstances 
are created by her. Although she was terminated from the J. C. 
Penny Company on August 5, 1974, (R.122, L 16) she was able to 
earn $1,860 for only seven month's work, (R.92). Her tax return 
does not reflect unemployment compensation which has been paid to 
her and at the time of the hearing, was still being paid to her 
at the rate of $23 per week*. (R.123, L 16-19). Therefore, in 
addition to the $200 per month received from the plaintiff in 
alimony, she received $265 per month for the seven months of 
employment at J. C. Penny Company, and during those months 
she was on unemployment, she received a monthly compensation 
of approximately $99 per month. 
In King v. King, [1970] 25 Utah 2d 163, 478 P2d 492, 
which was remanded for rehearing and an appeal taken from the 
rehearing in King v. King, [19y2] 27 Utah 2d 313, 495 P2d 823, 
the facts and circumstances were very similar to this case 
except there were no minor children from the marriage. 
In King, the parties married in 1949 when 
the plaintiff was 37 years old. The marriage lasted a total 
of 16 years and at the time of the divorce the plaintiff, 
wife, would have been 53 years old. I 
The plaintiff wife was given the most substantial part 
of the family assets: 
1. The family home with an equity of between $12,000 
and $14,000. 
2. The furniture. 
3. Each of the parties got an automobile. 
4. The defendant paid all of the family debts and 
obligations. 
5. The defendant paid $250 per month alimony to plain-
tiff until the home was paid off; 
6. Upon pay-off of the home, the defendant paid $200 
per month alimony thereafter. 
In 1967, the defendant ran into some financial pro-
blems associated with the Kennecott Copper Corporation strike 
which lasted for 6 months. As a result of the strike, the 
plaintiff filed an action against the defendant in Re: Contempt 
for nonpayment and the defendant filed an Order to Show Cause 
to reduce alimo y. 
In the Court't deliberation, they compared the present 
status of the parties to their status at the time of the divorce. 
The Court considered the defendant's income which had remained 
approximately the same. The Court recognized as a subordinate 
obligation, the fact that the defendant had remarried a woman 
with four children by a previous marriage and for which she 
was receiving some income. 
However, the main consideration of the Court was that 
the plaintiff, at the time of the divorce, ..was suffering from 
a nervous disorder and back trouble which prevented her from 
being gainfully employed. At the time of the hearing on the 
Order to Show Cause to reduce alimony, the Court found, (1J the 
plaintiff was capable of doing everything but the heaviest 
of lifting after a successful back fusion; (2) that she was 
capable of engaging in normal household activities and, (3) that 
she had had two or three different jobs, although for short 
periods of time. The Court found that the health of the 
plaintiff had improved to the extent that the plaintiff was 
able to seek and accept gainful employment, although she was, 
at the time of the hearing, unemployed. 
It was the Trial Court's Order that the alimony be 
reduced to $100 per month for six months and then to $50 per 
month for one year, and thereafter alimony would be terminated. 
On the second appeal, the Utah Supreme Court modified and affirmed 
the Trial Court's decision to provide that alimony continue in 
a nominal sum in the event that plaintiff would not be able to 
sustain herself in the event of unforeseeable circumstances. 
In the case at bar, Mrs. Laak has demonstrated and 
testified that she is fully and completely capable of employment, 
that she does receive a substantial alimony payment which amounts 
to more than 50 percent of her living expenses* Mrs. Laak is 
young, 51 years of age, and need only provide $138 per month 
to meet all of her monthly requirements. She has dmonstrated 
her ability to do this in the past and has ^ provided no evi-
dence that she is not capable of doing so presently and in the 
future. 
In appellant's brief, page 6, she alleges that modi-
fication should be granted because of a material change of 
conditions and she lists the following three: 
(a) Walter Laak's earnings had significantly increased; 
(b) The respondent no longer paid any child support; 
(c) Mable Laak's expenses had increased. 
It would appear that each and every one of the alleged 
material changes in circumstances were completely identifiable, 
and were in fact identified at the time of the entry of the 
Stipulation in the original Decree and were anticipated and 
onceded at the time of the original Decree. 
Obviously, since the Stipulation provided that her 
alimony would start only after the last minor child had been 
emancipated, it can be no surprise or materially changed cir-
cumstance that the respondent no longer pays any child sup-
port upon emancipation of the parties' last minor child and that 
plaintiff would not benefit from that change. 
Mr. Laak also was employed by the railroad at the 
time he was married to Mrs. Laak and obviously would be recei-
ving wage increases and has been receiving wage increases for 
the past 7 years. This also must have been anticipated by 
Mrs. Laak and can come as no surprise to her that Mr. Laak 
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is earning additional monies. 
However, Mrs. Laak must have realized and antici-
pated that she would be employed during this period of time 
and her wages would have increased or at least been sufficient 
enough to pay at least half of her needs. 
Alimony should not be made a form of retirement 
fund as prayed for by Mrs. Laak on page 8 of appellant's 
brief, wherein she feels that alimony should be raised to $350 
per month leaving her only a difference of $33 to meet her 
stated monthly obligation of $3 88 per month or if she were to 
cut some of her expenses by $33 she could effectively retire 
at age 51. 
It is the respondent's contention that the Trial 
Court carefully reviewed and considered each and every one of 
these points and made its decision fully within the sound dis-
cretion afforded the Trial Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant should be precluded from going be-
yond the Order of the Court dated November 29, 1974, which 
reinstated the terms and conditions of the original Decree of 
Divorce and ordered the continued payment of alimony at the 
rate of $200 per month. 
Alimony should not be a form of retirement, and a 
healthy and capable individual should provide at least one-half 
of her income, especially if her contribution would be at a 
nominal amount of $188 per month. -
Finally, when all of the facts and circumstances con-
sidered by a party petitioning for a modification, are the same 
facts and circumstances that were in existence and considered 
by the parties at the time that the original Stipulation and 
Decree of Divorce were entered, and when the Stipulations in 
those proceedings were bargained for and the resulting cir-
cumstances were fully anticipated seven years ago, then they 
are not the substantial material change necessary. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KING & CRAFT 
By 
DALE J. CRAFT 
Attorney for Respondent 
4 09 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
» 
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